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Is homonationalism influencing public opinion? 
Experimental and survey evidence from the UK and Romania 
Homonationalism is a proposed value configuration that promotes both accepting gay 
people and prejudice towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. This value configuration 
contrasts with the widely supported theory that all prejudices are positively related, and are 
explained by underlying causes such as authoritarianism. Although homonationalism has 
received attention in qualitative research on mass-media and political discourse, this is the 
first quantitative exploration of the concept. We used data from a society likely to be high on 
homonationalism (UK), and one likely to be low (Romania). None of our results were 
consistent with homonationalism, either in an experiment conducted with students (Study 1, 
N = 110), or in a secondary analysis of data from the same two countries (Study 2, N = 2638). 
Ethnic prejudice and homophobia were positively related, while homonationalism was 
negatively related to homophobia and authoritarianism. Homonationalism has little utility as 
a construct for understanding public opinion at this point in time, and research investigating it 
at other levels of analysis may be more fruitful. 
Keywords: authoritarianism; homonationalism; heteronationalism; homophobia. 
Is homonationalism influencing public opinion? 
Experimental and survey evidence from the UK and Romania 
Over the last few years, the media have often probed cross-cultural differences in 
lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) rights. In October 2014, The Economist ran a cover story 
contrasting Western and non-Western LGB rights policies. The issue’s cover mainly relied on 
contemporary Western visual clichés to represent gay rights: the title, ‘The Gay Divide,’ was 
printed in a rainbow-pattern font; and two disembodied, interlocked, male-looking hands 
formed the central image. The subtitle and the background were split: ‘Half the world has 
leapt forward…’ was printed on a white background, and ‘... but too many countries are 
going backward’ on a black background. The visual message reads easily: a white/bright pro- 
gay West is defined against a black/dark anti-gay rest of the world. 
Sexual mores have been used historically to argue for the cultural superiority or 
inferiority of certain ethnic groups, countries, or regions. For example, Europeans in the 19th 
century referred to the perceived promiscuity of other peoples as one of many rhetorical 
means to justify colonialism (Pryke, 1998). Today, sexuality is once again playing a role in 
how the West is compared to the rest of the world. In the wake of decolonisation and 
increased global mobility, many nationalist voices have refocused on restricting immigration 
to the West from poorer countries (see, e.g., Hekma, 2011). One argument used against 
immigrants is that they are less tolerant of LGB people than locals. Most typically, Muslim 
immigrants are seen as bringing in misogyny and homophobia to their (more progressive) 
host countries in Europe and North America (see Caldwell, 2009, for a book-long example of 
this discourse). Moreover, Western tolerance towards gay people has also been used as a 
rhetorical tool to vilify Middle-Eastern countries and to justify 21st century wars against them 
(Butler, 2009; Puar, 2007). ‘There is a transition underway in how queer subjects are relating 
to nation-states [...], from being figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to 
ideas of life and productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families).’ (Puar, 2007, p. xii). Now gay 
rights – rather than Victorian restraint – are the proof of Western superiority, and a reason to 
keep out the potentially less tolerant immigrants. This new dynamic of nation and sexuality 
has been called homonationalism (Puar, 2007). 
Conversely, many political voices in regions such as Eastern Europe see gay rights 
campaigns as an unwelcome Western interference in their culture: for example, gay pride 
parades have been construed as foreign by Romanian ultranationalists (Bartoș, Balş, & 
Berger, 2013). Such a sexuality-nationality dynamic has been called heteronationalism 
(Gosine, 2009). Indeed, research on sexuality and nationalism in Eastern Europe has typically 
found that gay people were excluded from depictions of  national identity, and associated 
with a West construed as morally corrupt (see, e.g., the first issue of the journal Sextures, 
dedicated to ‘Queering sexual citizenship’). Accordingly, social scientists need to examine 
the extent to which homo- and heteronationalism might be changing the landscape of pro and 
anti-gay public opinion in Europe. 
Homonationalism and Psychology 
Puar (2007) analysed American discourses on the US’s recent defence policies, and 
identified three thematic strands in homonationalistic talk: (1) the acceptance of gay people 
makes the US better than other countries; (2) (pro-gay) secularism is construed as normal, 
while Muslims are rejected; and (3) US superiority (gained via gay rights) legitimises war 
against other countries. Polar opposites of these assertions can be found in heteronationalistic 
discourse: homophobia is normalised, and the quest for gay rights is construed as (Western) 
aggression (Bartos et al., 2013). 
For psychology, homonationalism (as well as heteronationalism) is interesting for at 
least two reasons. First, homonationalism includes sexuality in national (self-) definition, in 
addition to the more familiar territorial, linguistic, and religious criteria. Therefore, such 
binary pairs become possible as Muslim versus gay in the homonationalistic West (Butler, 
2009), and Romanian versus gay in the heteronationalistic East (Bartoș et al., 2013; 
Nachescu, 2005). 
A classic study by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971) found that categorising 
people into ingroup and outgroup leads to ingroup favouritism, i.e., the tendency to allocate 
more resources to one’s own group. Ingroup favouritism is not, however, limited to 
maximising the resources of one’s own group, but it also involves maximising the difference 
between the ingroup and the outgroup: resources are allocated in such a way that the ingroup 
shall get more than the outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971). Difference maximisation will go as far 
as sacrificing some of the ingroup’s gains to ensure that the outgroup obtains comparatively 
less (Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007). Puar’s (2007) work suggests that Westerners 
regard LGB people as ingroup members when they contrast themselves with a Muslim 
outgroup. Difference maximisation has been found when groups were defined by nationality 
(Sidanius et al., 2007) and by sexuality (Fasoli, Maass, & Carnaghi, 2015), but it remains an 
open question whether difference maximisation could also be driven by homonationalism. It 
is also an open question whether the homo- and heteronationalistic discourses in the media 
can influence how people allocate resources to groups. In this paper, we will assess whether 
the resource allocation bias described by Tajfel et al. (1971) can be replicated in relation to 
the Muslim-versus-gay binary. 
Second, homonationalism implies a surprising relationship between homophobia and 
ethnic prejudice for social psychologists. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford 
(1950) asserted that all prejudices (racism, sexism, homophobia etc.) were underlain by a 
personality trait they named authoritarianism. In brief, “authoritarianism is an individual 
predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and 
uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other.” (Stenner, 
2005, p. 14) Extensive research conducted since Adorno et al.’s work has generally 
confirmed that authoritarianism has widespread implications. Authoritarianism is a strong 
predictor of all forms of prejudice, such a homophobia, racism and misogyny (Altemeyer, 
1998; Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Stenner, 2005; Whitley & Lee, 2000). 
Homophobia has often been found to be correlated with racism (Aosved & Long, 
2006; Campo-Arias Oviedo, & Herazo, 2014) and other forms of ethnic prejudice (Hadler, 
2012; Whitley & Lee, 2000), and authoritarianism explains a significant part of their shared 
variance (Stenner, 2005). But if groups had homonationalistic beliefs, then we would expect 
to see individuals with lower levels of homophobia to also show higher levels of ethnic 
prejudice. Such a pattern of homonationalistic prejudice would be difficult to understand or 
explain from the standpoint of Adorno et al.’s authoritarianism theory. Such a pattern of 
beliefs would suggest that a concept of homonationalism is required in social psychology to 
provide an alternative understanding of prejudice to that offered by the authoritarian 
personality. The present paper examines the implications of homonationalism for the 
authoritarian-personality hypothesis, and the social psychology of prejudice more broadly. 
But why would homonationalism emerge in the West, while the more traditional 
heteronationalistic attitudes persist elsewhere? Many traditional religions condemn 
homosexuality, and many people in Western societies have moved away from these belief 
systems in the 20th century (Hadler, 2012). Therefore, secularisation may be a driver of new 
attitudes towards sexuality. Western societies have also experienced a more pervasive value 
shift that Ronald Inglehart (2008; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) has called postmodernisation: 
equality, diversity, and self-affirmation have become primary goals for these societies and 
their governments, often eclipsing economic priorities. LGB people, like other oppressed 
groups, have formed social movements and they have achieved various degrees of acceptance 
across the Western world. Eastern Europe has experienced less secularisation and less 
postmodernisation than the West, which may explain higher levels of homophobia and, 
possibly, lower levels of homonationalism. 
Research on Homonationalism 
Some journalists and commentators have quickly adopted the notion of 
homonationalism. The term itself, technical as it may seem to be, has been taken up to some 
extent in popular discourse: since the publication of Puar’s book in 2007, it appeared at least 
120 times in the English-language news outlets indexed by Google News. Two-thirds of these 
occurrences date from 2017-2016, when they were used to discuss the outreach of prominent 
nationalist politicians (such as Donald Trump and Marine LePen) to gay voters. 
Homonationalism has been the subject of much theoretical and discursive work, but 
seemingly no psychological research. The available philosophical reflections and qualitative 
studies suggests that homonationalistic discourses flourish: from Israeli tourist 
advertisements (Puar, 2014) to Dutch political manifestos (Hekma, 2011) and American war 
reports (Butler, 2009), pro-gay attitudes are used to contrast a ‘civilised’ nation to ‘backward’ 
ethnic groups. This evidence, however, almost invariably comes from the analysis of news 
reports, political speeches, and other professionally crafted texts. The social psychological 
question remains how these messages are reflected in people's thoughts and behaviours. This 
is not to suggest that discourse lacks reality, only that prejudice can and should be understood 
at different levels of analysis (Bartos & Hegarty, 2014). 
In this paper, we aim to explore homonationalism with the tools of quantitative social 
psychology. Therefore, we investigate (1) whether homonationalism can be measured and (2) 
whether the predictions of the prejudice literature summarised above apply to 
homonationalism. We report two studies. In both studies, we asked whether homonationalism 
reverses the positive relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice, thus posing an 
exception to the classic proposition of Adorno et al. (1950) that all prejudices are positively 
related. First, we designed a questionnaire and an experiment to quantify homonationalism. 
We tested the homonationalism hypothesis on two similar samples of undergraduate students 
from Romania and the UK, thus allowing for cross-cultural comparisons (Study 1). Given the 
small size and low demographic diversity of these samples, we then tested a similar 
hypothesis on secondary data from the same two countries (Study 2). 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we sought to operationalise homonationalism and explore its power to 
explain prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour in one Eastern European and one 
Western European country. To this end, we designed a homonationalism questionnaire and an 
experimental task. The questionnaire consisted of 6 items describing Puar’s (2007) three 
facets of homonationalism and contrasting heteronationalistic statements (see Table 1). 
Homonationalistic discourse occurs in Western Europe, while in Eastern Europe it is made 
largely impossible by the prevalence of homophobia (Bartos et al., 2013; Kulpa, 2011). We 
therefore predicted that UK participants would be more homonationalistic than their 
Romanian peers. 
--Table 1 about here -- 
Second, we performed an experiment to test whether priming participants on tensions 
between sexual and ethnic minorities influenced their allocation of resources to gay and 
Muslim groups. Homonationalistic discourse suggests that LGB people are part of the 
ingroup and constructs Muslims as an outgroup for Western nations. Proponents of the 
homonationalism concept argue that the mass-media systematically reinforce this binary, 
exacerbating intergroup tensions (e.g., Butler, 2009; Puar, 2007). We tested the hypothesis 
that priming homonationalism would shift resource allocation to maximise the relative gains 
of gay groups over Muslim groups. Increasing the perception that two groups are in conflict 
can enhance ingroup favouritism and difference maximisation when allocating resources, 
especially if participants already hold prejudiced views of the outgroup. Thus, people may be 
willing to sacrifice the resources of their own group to make sure that the outgroup is not at 
an advantage; Sidanius et al. (2007) have called this sacrifice during resource allocation, 
‘Vladimir’s choice.’1 In this study, participants were asked to allocate resources to one 
Muslim and one gay charity based on an allocation scheme akin to Tajfel matrices (Tajfel et 
al., 1971). As in Sidanius et al. (2007), participants could opt either to maximise the gains of 
both groups by giving more money to the Muslim cause than the gay cause; or to give 
relatively more to the gay cause, at the cost of offering both charities a smaller amount of 
money (i.e., to make Vladimir’s choice). Prior to this resource allocation task, participants 
read one news flash that presented either Muslim immigrants or local Christians as disrupting 
a gay pride event. If homonationalism represents a new ingroup/outgroup binary that is 
anchored in representations of competing interests of gay and Muslim groups, then one 
would expect more homonationalistic participants to also be more likely to make Vladimir’s 
choice. 
Finally, we formulate a prediction independent of the measure of homonationalism 
developed here, but relevant to the concept of homonationalism. We predicted that the 
positive relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice would be weaker in the UK 
than in Romania, if the UK were indeed more homonationalistic, and thus had more pro-gay 
nationalists. Differences between countries in the level of prejudice have been explained by 
differences in postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1997), authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005) and 
religiosity (Štulhofer & Rimac, 2009). Therefore, we predicted that the country had no 
moderating effect on the relationship between ethnic prejudice and homophobia when 
controlling for authoritarianism, religiosity and postmaterialism. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 110 students aged 18-30 from the UK (n = 55) and 
Romania (n = 55). As a reward, UK students were entered into a prize draw, while Romanian 
students received research credit. Initially, 141 students participated. The 10 participants over 
the age of 30 were excluded to achieve a more homogeneous sample of young adults. A 
further six Muslim participants were excluded because homonationalism refers only to non- 
Muslim people’s construction of Muslims as an-outgroup. Finally, 15 participants who 
identified with a sexuality other than straight or heterosexual were also removed from the 
sample. Most participants in both countries were women: 75% in the UK and 78% in 
Romania. 
Personal values. Religiosity was assessed on a 7-point Likert scale2 on the 
importance of religion in the participant’s life (see, e.g., Inglehart, 1997). Postmaterialism 
was assessed using Inglehart’s (1997) items. Specifically, participants were asked to prioritise 
goals for their country, choosing between materialistic (e.g., economic growth) and 
postmaterialistic (e.g., clean environment) goals. Higher scores indicate more 
postmaterialistic values. Authoritarianism was measured with a short version of Altemeyer’s 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (15 items, Zakrisson, 2005). Apart from brevity, this 
version has the advantage of avoiding direct questions on homosexuality, thus minimising the 
overlap with other measures. The scale had good internal consistency in the current sample, 
Cronbach’s α = .780. 
Homophobia. We assessed participants’ attitude to LGB issues with Morrison and 
Morrison’s (2002) 12-item Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS). The instrument was highly 
reliable (current α = .875), and it was strongly correlated with other measures of homophobia 
(all rs > .72; Rye & Meaney, 2010). 
Ethnic prejudice. Most measures of national, racial and ethnic prejudice are 
developed in specific contexts and with reference to specific groups, which creates 
difficulties in cross-cultural comparisons. Following Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001), 
we selected seven items from a scale developed to measure prejudice against immigrants in 
the UK (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) that are applicable to both Romania and the UK. We 
asked participants to answer the questionnaire with reference to the ethnic group in their 
country from which they feel the most distant. Participants were not asked to name the ethnic 
group they were referring to, both to reduce the effect of social desirability which is high in 
racism research, and to allow participants to choose the most appropriate target of their 
attitudes. The measure showed very good internal consistency, α = .785. 
Homonationalism. We constructed a 6-item Homonationalism Scale (HN) to 
measure homonationalism based on Puar’s (2006) work (see Table 1). Higher scores indicate 
greater homonationalism. The psychometric qualities of this measure are described below. 
Experimental Task. We designed a task in which participants allocated resources to 
gay and Muslim charities. As with the ethnic prejudice measure, we aimed to construct a task 
that was decontextualised enough to suit both countries. Christian locals in an unnamed 
Belgian3 town were the intended ingroup, while Muslim immigrants in the same town were 
the outgroup. The seven resource allocation options were those used in the ‘Vladimir’s 
choice’ matrix (Sidanius et al., 2007). The first three options allocated more money to the 
Muslim charity, the fourth option allocated equal amounts to both charities, and the last three 
option allocated more to the gay charity. Thus, allocating £19,000 to the gay charity and 
£25,000 to the Muslim charity was scored ‘1’; allocating £13,000 to each charity was scored 
‘4’; and allocating £7,000 to the gay charity and £1,000 to the Muslim charity was scored ‘7’. 
Accordingly, participants could only disfavour the Muslim charity by also cutting funds from 
the gay one, i.e., by making ‘Vladimir’s choice’. The full options are presented in Table 2. 
--Table 2 about here-- 
Procedure. The experimental task was presented before the other measures to a 
randomly-selected half of the participants, and after the other measures to the rest of the 
participants. Romanian translations were performed by the first author; back-translations 
were obtained via Google Translate (http://translate.google.co.uk) and with the assistance of a 
Romanian native speaker. 
Results 
The Homonationalism Scale. To explore the properties of the newly constructed 
homonationalism scale, a principal components analysis was conducted. A one-factor 
solution proved to be adequate, but only after one item was eliminated; see Table 1. The 
Keiser-Meyer-Olkin test suggested the sampling was acceptable but modest, KMO = .628. 
The single factor had an eigenvalue of 2.176, and it explained 43.529 % of the variance. The 
absolute values of the loadings of individual items ranged from .519 to .707. The scale thus 
constructed had an acceptable internal consistency, Cronbach α = .674. 
In order to further examine the properties of our homonationalism scale, its 
correlations with the other variables were computed. (See Table 3.) As expected, 
homonationalism was strongly and negatively related to homophobia, r (109) = - .626, p 
< .001. Given that homophobia explained more than one third of the variance of 
homonationalism, partial correlations controlling for homophobia were also computed. 
Surprisingly, homonationalism was negatively correlated with ethnic prejudice, r (109) = 
- .411, p < .001. However, this was no longer the case when controlling for homophobia,
partial r (107) = -.072, p = .459. It is also noteworthy that the homonationalism scale showed 
medium-to-strong negative correlations with authoritarianism and religiosity both when raw 
scores were considered and when controlling for homophobia. In other words, there was no 
evidence that homonationalism was associated with greater levels of ethnic prejudice, even 
after the relationship between homonationalism and pro-gay attitudes was partialled out. 
--Table 3 about here-- 
We also examined the correlations between individual homonationalism items and the 
other variables (Table 3). These results were consistent overall with the conclusions drawn 
from analysing the homonationalism scale: participants who agreed more with 
homonationalistic items tended to be less homophobic, less prejudiced towards ethnic 
minorities, less authoritarian and less religious. Those who agreed more with 
heteronationalistic statements also had higher scores for homophobia, ethnic prejudice, 
authoritarianism and more religiosity. Postmaterialism and resource allocation showed weak 
associations with these items. The item we excluded from the homonationalism scale (Item 6) 
did not significantly correlate with any other variable. 
As predicted, homonationalism scores were higher in UK (M = 4.88, SD = 0.89) than in 
Romanian (M = 4.48, SD = 1.02) participants, t (108) = 2.17, p = .032, d = 0.42. Given the 
strong correlation between homonationalism and homophobia, we performed an ANCOVA to 
assess the difference in homonationalism between Romania and the UK when controlling for 
homophobia. The effect of homophobia was large and significant, F (1, 107) = 61.833, p 
< .001, η² = .366. The effect of the country was small and nonsignificant, F (1, 107) = 0.230, 
p = .633, η² = .002. Country differences in homonationalism were entirely explained by 
country differences in homophobia, suggesting no need to posit an additional factor other 
than homophobic attitudes to explain ideological differences between the West and the East. 
Next, we tested the hypothesis that homonationalism moderated the link between 
homophobia and ethnic prejudice. We performed a linear regression analysis using mean 
centred predictors. The model was significant, F (3, 106) = 38.267, p < .001; and it explained 
a large proportion of the variance of homophobia, adjusted R² = .506. Both ethnic prejudice 
(b = 0.387, SE = 0.073, β = .393, p < .001) and homonationalism (b = - 0.475, SE = 0.076, β 
= - .465, p < .001) had a significant effect on homophobia. The effect of the product of the 
predictors, however, was nonsignificant, b = 0.009, SE = 0.070, β = .009, p = .892. 
Accordingly, the moderation hypothesis was not supported: homonationalism does not 
moderate the link between homophobia and ethnic prejudice. 
Resource Allocation. Resource allocation did not differ between the two countries: 
UK participants (M = 4.42, SD = 1.27) had a nonsignificantly stronger tendency to make 
Vladimir’s choice than their Romanian peers (M = 4.24, SD = 1.27), t (108) = 0.720, p 
= .473, d = 0.139. The experimental manipulation4  also had no main effect on resource 
allocation. Rather, a nonsignificant trend was observed in the direction contrary to the one 
expected: those in the control group had a nonsignificantly stronger tendency towards 
Vladimir’s choice (M = 4.45, SD = 1.25) than those exposed to homonationalistic messages 
(M = 4.20, SD = 1.39), t (108) = - 1.011, p = .314, d = - 0.183. Resource allocation was not 
correlated with homonationalism, r (109) = - .060, p = .533. To test if the effect of 
experimental manipulation on resource allocation was moderated by homonationalism, we 
performed a linear regression analysis using mean centred predictors. The model was not 
significant, F (3, 106) = 0.716, p = .545, adjusted R² = .008. Neither the experimental 
condition (b = - 0.146, SE = 0.128, β = - .111, p = .256), nor homonationalism (b = - 0.120, 
SE = 0.134, β = - .089, p = .371) had a significant effect on resource allocation. The 
interaction was also nonsignificant, b = - 0.094, SE = 0.134, β = - .068, p = .484. Thus, the 
moderation hypothesis was not supported. 
Tests of Other A Priori Hypotheses. Finally, we assessed the hypothesis that the 
relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice is weaker in the UK due to an 
influence of homonationalism. A hierarchical linear regression analysis were performed with 
homophobia as the criterion variable. See Table 4. In Step 1, we entered ethnic prejudice and 
participants’ country. Ethnic prejudice was a significant and strong predictor of homophobia, 
but participants’ nationality was not. The model was significant, adjusted R² = .341, F (2, 
107) = 27.695, p < .001. In Step 2, we entered the interaction between country and ethnic 
prejudice. This was nonsignificant, and it did not improve the model, adjusted R² = .001, F 
(1, 106) = 0.191, p = .663. In Step 3, we added authoritarianism, postmaterialism, and 
religiosity. None of these predictors was significant individually, but they collectively 
improved the model, ΔR² = .082, F (3, 103) = 4.914, p < .01. The effect of ethnic prejudice 
on homophobia remained large and significant after controlling for all other variables, b = 
0.498, SE = 0.089, p < .001, β = .506. See Table 4 for details. In sum we found no evidence 
that homonationalism had weakened the relationship between homophobia and ethnic 
prejudice in the UK. 
--Table 4 about here-- 
Discussion 
The results enabled by the homonationalism scale and by the resource allocation task 
did not support the homonationalism hypothesis for several reasons. First, contrary to 
expectations, the positive relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice was not 
weaker in participants high on homonationalism. Second, a media message that showed gay 
and Muslim people in conflict did not prompt participants to disfavour Muslims to a greater 
extent in resource allocation, even among participants who were comparatively high on 
homonationalism. Third, UK participants were indeed more homonationalistic than their 
Romanian peers, but this difference was entirely explained by UK participants being less 
homophobic. 
Whilst this first quantitative investigation of homonationalism casts doubt on the 
importance of the concept and its explanatory power. In Study 1, student participants were 
employed as an efficient way to obtain comparable samples in different countries. Students 
are the ideal participants for cognitively demanding tasks that require complex thinking about 
social and political issues (Dasgupta & Hunsinger, 2008). However, Henry (2008) found that 
American students are less prejudiced than non-students, and their prejudice toward specific 
groups has a weaker relationship with their general belief in equality. Study 1 also had a 
small sample. Sensitivity analyses suggested this study could detect medium-sized effects for 
mean differences (d = 0.54), correlations (r = .26), and linear regression with two predictors 
(R² = .09), with α = .05 and 1 – β = .80. However, the study may have been underpowered for 
detecting interactions, which requires sample sizes several times larger than a comparable 
main effect (Aiken and West, 1991) . Study 2 employed a much larger, non-student sample. 
Study 2 
Mindful of the limitations of student samples, we designed a second test of the 
homonationalism hypothesis. Specifically, we reanalyse data from the World Values Survey 
(World Values Survey Association, 2015) and its sister project, the European Values Study 
(European Values Study, 2015; henceforth WVS/EVS), in order to study homophobia in a 
larger, cross-cultural sample. The WVS/EVS systematically collects data on people’s 
attitudes on dozens of issues, regularly surveying about one thousand participants from most 
of countries around the world. 
The WVS/EVS contains data from thousands of participants of all ages and all 
backgrounds using measures that have been extensively studied over time (see below). Of 
course, WVS/EVS contains no direct measure of homonationalism. However, it can be used 
to test a thesis similar to the last hypothesis of Study 1. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis 
that the relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice is moderated by participants’ 
nationality, and that the role of nationality is explained by country-level differences in 
religiosity, authoritarianism and postmaterialism. 
Data 
Participants. Individual-level data from Romania and the UK were used from data 
collection Wave 6 (2006-2010). Participants were 2683 respondents to the survey (1372 in 
the UK and 1311 in Romania) who had complete data on all variables of interest. Overall, 
12.43 % of the cases were discarded due to missing values. Participants were aged 16 to 94 
(M = 50.33, SD= 18.09). British participants (M = 52.08, SD = 18.82) were slightly older 
than their Romanian peers (M = 48.51, SD = 17.12), t (2671) = 5.122, p < .001, d = 0.190. As 
for gender, 56.4 % of the participants were women. 
Personal values. Religiosity was assessed through a question (F034) allowing people 
to categorise themselves as either religious (1), non-religious (2) or atheists (3). To make the 
results easier to interpret, we reversed the coding of this variable so that religious people scored 
the highest and atheists the lowest. Postmaterialism was assessed with the same method as in 
Study1. The resulting variable (Y002) approximated a normal distribution (skewness and 
kurtosis values in all three countries < 2). Following Stenner (2005), a measure of 
authoritarianism was computed based on the WVS items on childrearing values (A027 – A034; 
see Stenner, 2005). The respective questions assess the importance placed by participants on 
such authority-focused values as obedience, and such independence-focused values as 
creativity. As anticipated (Stenner, 2005), the measure of authoritarianism computed from 
childrearing values had low internal consistency, particularly in Eastern European samples 
(Cronbach’s α = .256 in the UK, .142 in Romania). However, the scale seems to have very 
good convergent validity, being the strongest predictor of homophobia across cultures (see also 
Stenner, 2005, for other cultures and other forms of prejudice). 
Ethnic prejudice. Ethnic prejudice was operationalised as the rejection of immigrant 
neighbours. Specifically, participants were asked to pick from a list the types of people they 
would not like as neighbours, “immigrants” being one option (A124_06). This measure was 
therefore dichotomous: immigrants were either selected (1) or not selected (0) from the list. 
Homophobia. Two measures of homophobia were used. A dichotomous survey item 
(A124_09) indicated whether participants chose ‘homosexuals’ from a list of potentially 
undesirable neighbours. We will call this measure social distance. Participants also assessed 
the morality of homosexuality (F118) on a scale ranging from ‘never justifiable’ (1) to ‘always 
justifiable’ (10). In many countries (including Romania), (1) is the most frequent answer. 
Therefore, this variable has often been dichotomised (e.g., Inglehart, 1997) to contrast those 
for whom homosexuality was never justifiable (1) with all other respondents (0). We 
dichotomized the measure in this study also, and called this measure moral rejection. 
Analysis 
Separate hierarchical binary logistic regression analyses were performed for the two 
measures of homophobia. The models were otherwise identical. In Step 1, we entered 
immigrant rejection and participants’ country as predictors. In Step 2, we added the 
interaction between country and immigrant rejection. In Step 3, we added authoritarianism, 
postmaterialism, and religiosity. Both measures of homophobia were higher in those who also 
rejected immigrants, and in Romanian participants. The interaction terms added in Step 2 
rendered results that contradicted the focal homonationalism hypothesis. For the social 
distance item about homosexuals, the interaction between country and ethnic prejudice was 
significant, but in the direction opposite to the one expected based on homonationalism: the 
association between homophobia and ethnic prejudice was stronger in the UK (OR = 7.695) 
than in Romania (OR = 2.810). For the item on the moral rejection of homosexuality, the 
interaction between country and ethnic prejudice was nonsignificant. In the case of both 
outcome measures, authoritarianism, postmaterialism and religiosity improved the model 
without meaningfully affecting the effects of the other predictors. The predictions generated 
by the homonationalism hypothesis were entirely unsupported. See Table 5 for details. 
--Table 5 about here-- 
Discussion 
The relationship between homophobia and ethnic prejudice was not stronger in 
Romania than in the UK, nor was it related to other predictors of prejudice such as 
authoritarianism, postmaterialism and religiosity. Unlike Study 1, however, Study 2 had a 
large representative sample, and enough statistical power to detect even small effects. The 
conclusions of both studies engendered doubt about the social psychological importance of 
homonationalism. 
As with any secondary analysis, the datasets we used did not always contain the best 
type of data to answer our questions. Quantifying authoritarianism within the WVS is 
manageable but complex, as explained in the section on Data. The measurement of 
homophobia in the WVS might be problematic for current purposes. The two questions asked 
in the WVS explore blatant prejudice, ignoring the emergence of more subtle modern 
homophobia (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). However, Rye and Meaney’s (2010) comparison 
of homophobia scales found very high correlations among all measures, regardless of the 
type of prejudice they addressed. 
General Discussion 
Our findings across both studies were overwhelmingly inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that homonatinalism has exerted a distinct influence on the ideology of the West 
creating a pro-gay rationalization of ethnic prejudice in general and Islamophobia in 
particular. Contrary to this hypothesis, homonationalism was not associated with ethnic 
prejudice, and cross-national differences in homonationalism were explained by differences 
in existing measures of homophobia. Resource allocation to ethnic and sexual minorities was 
not sensitive to homonationalistic messages, and it was not related to participants’ 
homonationalism scores either. Moreover, the degree to which homophobia and ethnic 
prejudice were associated either did not differ between Romania and the UK or was stronger 
in the UK than in Romania. The data thus failed to support the conjecture that Western 
countries now have more specifically pro-gay racists. 
As opposed to homonationalism, our results are largely consistent with the classical 
understanding of prejudice proposed by Adorno et al. (1950). The correlation between 
homophobia and ethnic persisted across different measures, samples and countries. 
Religiosity and postmaterialism were related to homophobia only in Study 2, but not in the 
smaller student sample of Study 1. Authoritarianism was significantly related to the moral 
rejection of homosexuality (Study 2), but only marginally to modern homonegativity (Study 
1) and not at all to social distance (Study 2). This, the classical understanding of prejudice fits
the data better than the homonationalism hypothesis, but its explanatory power was not 
consistent across all measures and methodologies. 
The correlations between the homonationalism scale and other instruments suggest 
that this new scale measures a facet of homophobia, but not the concept of homonationalism 
proposed in other literatures. Homonationalism scores were correlated strongly with 
homophobia. They also correlated with religiosity and authoritarianism, even when 
controlling for homophobia. Most importantly, the homonationalism scale was not 
independently related to ethnic prejudice, and the item that made the most explicit reference 
to ethnic minorities (“Some ethnic groups in our country present a threat to LGB people’s full 
equality.”) needed to be excluded for the homonationalism scale to achieve internal 
consistency. The questionnaire therefore seems to capture a form of opposition to 
authoritarian, religiously conservative attitudes towards LGB people that is not entirely 
covered by the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). However, we have discovered no 
empirical basis for caution that this opposition leads to new, particular or worrying forms of 
outgroup hatred or ostracism of immigrants or ethnoreligious minorities. 
One should not, however, immediately or categorically conclude that such a thing as 
homonationalism does not exist in any sense. The juxtaposition of current quantitative 
findings and previous qualitative research suggests that homonationalism as defined by Puar 
(2007) could be a rhetorical tool rather than a construct reflecting public opinion or private 
attitudes. The use of such statements to create ethnic tensions is likely to be limited to public 
discourse, without much reflection in people’s attitudes. It seems that homonationalism is a 
discursive repertoire that exploits new developments in sexual politics, but it is not the 
essence of these developments. Puar (2007) was probably right in claiming ‘no organic unity 
or cohesion’ (p. 10) for homonationalism. Further qualitative research in psychology may 
identify aspects of homonationalism that are more relevant to the discipline than further 
quantitative research. 
In conclusion, the present study has found limited use for the concept of 
homonationalism in explaining the psychology of prejudice. The relationships between 
homophobia, ethnic prejudice, and related constructs were consistent with the established 
model: the two types of prejudice were positively related, and linked to authoritarianism. We 
did not find a homonationalistic attitudinal configuration either in participants from the West 
or postmaterialistic participants. However, a questionnaire containing items on LGB issues 
framed in a geopolitical terms was negatively related to religiosity, authoritarianism, ethnic 
prejudice, and homophobia. Given that the items refer to current geopolitical issues, we think 
it possible that the homonationalism scale captures a stage in the evolution of homophobia 
that is past the ‘modern homonegativity’ measured by the MHS, but does not indicate that 
homonationalism is a salient part of that landscape. Homonationalism may exist, and may 
have a reality in public opinion, but the current investigations show no empirical support for 
this view. 
Footnotes 
1 The name originates in a Russian folk tale in which the protagonist (Vladimir) 
sacrificed his own gains for an opportunity to punish his foe. 
2 Unless otherwise specified, all variables in this study represent the means of 7-point 
Likert scale items. 
3 Belgium was chosen as a country with comparatively few associations relevant to this study 
in either the UK or Romania. Note that the experiment was conducted before Brussels was 
the scene of extensive anti-terror investigations in November 2015. 
4 The order of presentation had no effect on any variable of interest. All t tests were 
nonsignificant. 
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Table 1. Summary of principal components analysis for the homonationalism scale (N = 110). The full scale comprises all the proposed 
items, while the revised scale contains only the five items retained for the final version of the instrument. IRI = item reliability index (corrected 
item-total correlation). 
Puar’s label Item Item content Full scale Revised scale 
Loading IRI Loading IRI 
Queer as 1 Gay rights threaten the traditional .694 .323 .700 .473 
regulatory way of life in some cultures.* 
Sexual 2 Countries that support gay rights -.656 .484 -.649 .411 
exceptionalism are better than countries that don’t. 
Queer as 3 Some ethnic groups in our -.030 .010 - - 
regulatory country present a threat to LGB people’s 
full equality. 
The 4 Developed countries should -.711 .515 -.707 .476 
ascendancy of influence less developed countries to be 
whiteness more accepting of LGB people. 
Sexual 5 Traditional heterosexual families .704 .474 .703 .471 
exceptionalism are a defining aspect of our culture.* 
The 6 Rich countries often force poorer .513 .219 .519 .309 
ascendancy of countries to accept gay rights.* 
whiteness 
Eigenvalue 2.177 2.176 
Variance explained (%) 36.281 43.529 
Cronbach α .593 .674 
*Reverse coded (heteronationalistic) item.
Table 2. Response options for the “Vladimir’s choice” task (adapted from Sidanius et al., 2007). 
Option LGBT Equality Group Muslim Charitable Fund Participant score 
A €19,000 €25,000 1 
B €17,000 €21,000 2 
C €15,000 €17,000 3 
D €13,000 €13,000 4 
E €11,000 €9,000 5 
F €9,000 €5,000 6 
G €7,000 €1,000 7 










































































allocation -.060 .053 -.014 .011 
.00 
3 -.213* -.063 .119 




- 0.09 -.03 .663 
0.040 1 5 
.00 .663 
1 
3 Intercept 1.98 0.58 .001 
2 3 
Country (UK) - 0.08 -.07 .397 
0.076 9 7 
Table 4. Hierarchical linear model predicting homophobia (N = 110). 
Step p 
B SE β 
1 Intercept 3.22 0.07 < .00 
9 7 1 
Country (UK) - 0.09 -.02 .758 
0.028 0 8 
Ethnic 0.58 0.08 .59 < .00 
prejudice 9 9 8 1 
Adjusted R² .34 < .00 
1 1 
2 Intercept 3.24 0.09 < .00 
9 0 1 
Country (UK) - 0.09 -.03 .733 
0.031 0 1 
Ethnic 0.59 0.09 .60 < .00 















































Table 5. Hierarchical binary logistic models predicting social distance and moral 
rejection (N = 2,683). 
tep ictors 
Pred Social distance Moral rejection 
E R E R 
cept 0.343 .049 .001 .709 .146 .051 004 .157 




Inter .  
cept 0.570 .057 .001 .566 .131 .058 025 .140 
Ethn 
ic prejudice .537 .113 .001 .650 .704 .117 .001 .021 
Cou 
ntry(UK) 2.143 .113 .001 .117 2.121 .117 .001 .120 
Cou .  










cept 0.157 .193 416 .855 .482 .183 008 .619 
Ethn 
ic prejudice .537 .118 .001 .649 .630 .120 .001 .877 
Cou 











001 .454 .477 .101 .001 
118.060 
.612 













162 .073 .294 .048 .001 .342 
